Swarthmore College

Works
Psychology Faculty Works

Psychology

2017

Why Do Hills Look So Steep?
Frank H. Durgin
Swarthmore College, fdurgin1@swarthmore.edu

Z. Li

Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-psychology
Part of the Psychology Commons

Let us know how access to these works benefits you

Recommended Citation
Frank H. Durgin and Z. Li. (2017). "Why Do Hills Look So Steep?". Oxford Compendium Of Visual Illusions.
190-197.
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-psychology/988

This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Psychology Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact
myworks@swarthmore.edu.

Chapter 16

Why Do Hills Look So Steep?

Frank H. Durgin and Zhi Li

Estimates of underfoot ground orientation while standing
on a ramp, for example, show similar patterns of overesti
mation—even for congenitally blind participants (Hajnal,
Abdul-Malak, & Durgin, 2011). Indeed, very steep ramps
(i.e., 14°) can be judged even steeper under foot (haptically) than when regarded visually (Durgin et al., 2009;
Hajnal et al., 2011). Spatial bias in the haptic perception
of surface slant has recently been reviewed (Durgin &
Li, 2012). This chapter focuses on visual slant perception
while noting similarities and differences with haptic slant
perception. Several of the phenomena discussed here,
such as the effect of viewing distance on slant perception,
are primarily relevant to vision.
Theories of slant overestimation have fallen into the two
broad categories of teleological (or functional) theories and
mechanistic (or incidental) theories. Functional theories
have focused on several kinds of perceptual or behavioral
advantages that might arise from the exaggerated coding
or representation of ground orientation. In the natural en
vironment, sensitivity to ground orientation might be used
as a basis for recognizing one’s facing direction or location
in a familiar geographic region (Nardi, Nitsch, & Bingman,
2010). It might also be particularly useful for taking en
ergetics into account during route planning (Bhalla
& Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt, 2006), and energy costs are
highly relevant to coding the vertical dimension of space
(Kammann, 1967). Perceptual error might even be used to
more efficiently guide motor planning (Hajnal et al., 2011;
Li & Durgin, 2012b) or simply to more efficiently represent
the layout of the environment (Durgin & Li, 2011a; Durgin,
Li, & Hajnal, 2010).
Incidental theories of slant misperception have in
cluded the idea that depth along the line of sight is fore
shortened (Ross, 1974), which is sufficient to predict that
uphill surfaces will appear too steep, that the perceived
horizontal is altered in the presence of hills (O’Shea &
Ross, 2007), or that perceptual biases tend to make sur
faces appear more frontal than they are (Gibson, 1950).
Each of these incidental theories has some measure of
support, but none of them seem to fully account for the
full range of observed perceptual biases. The incomplete
ness of these incidental theories has led some theorists to
neglect their importance. But a full account of the over
estimation of slant must take these facts into account
as well.

INTRODUCTION
A pervasive illusion in normal human experience is the
misperception of surface orientation or slant. An outdoor
path that ascends a hill of some 5° is typically judged to be
about 20° whether viewed from the top or bottom (Proffitt,
Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995). Conversely a hill that
appears to be about 30° to the casual observer will typi
cally turn out to be between 7° and 10° upon measurement.
The magnitude of this error is illustrated in Figure II. 16-1.
With experience, skiers, hikers, engineers, and other fre
quent viewers of measured hills become aware of this per
ceptual error and may learn to make more accurate verbal
estimates. However, as far as is known, the underlying
perceptual bias seems to persist (Durgin & Li, 2011a). In
this chapter we consider several different forms of theory
that have been proposed for understanding the overestima
tion of geographical slant in the context of summarizing
relevant findings.
To begin with ecological considerations, note that the
powerful force of gravity, including both its role in sur
face erosion and its role in toppling leaning structures,
compresses the range of ground orientations with which
humans are confronted. This fact is probably quite im
portant to understanding why surface orientation can be
systematically overestimated without much cost. The sta
tistical distribution of surface orientations in the environ
ment may, in fact, encourage the expanded coding of sur
face orientation (Durgin & Li, 2011a; Proffitt, 2006). The
second point is that errors in the estimation of surface
orientation do not depend exclusively on visual factors.

Figure II. 16-1. The basic phenomenology: If a hill appears to be
nearly 30°, it is probably about 8°. The perceptual error is consistent
with foreshortening along the line of sight in the pictured (uphill)
case, but downhill slopes also look very steep, which cannot be
explained by foreshortening along the line of sight.
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This chapter argues for a hybrid theory of slant misper
ception that includes both functional and incidental compo
nents. Whereas the exaggeration of the vertical dimension
has a clear value for layout recognition and route planning,
it may be that a more general perceptual coding advantage
supports both of these kinds of goals rather than privileg
ing one or the other. The phenomenology of slant percep
tion is relevant to this discussion.
CONSTANCY AND NONCONSTANCY IN SLANT
PERCEPTION
Constancy refers to the ability of an organism to perceive
one aspect of an object (such as slant) consistently despite
irrelevant changes in viewing conditions (such as view
ing orientation and optical distance). In this section we
examine constancy and explain that there are at least
two important respects in which the perception of slant is
clearly not constant and three important respects in which

it is surprisingly constant. In general, purely functional
ist theories have limited resources for accounting for the
failures of constancy described here, whereas purely inci
dental theories are often contraindicated by the presence
of constancy.
Effects of Viewing Distance
As viewing distance from a hill surface increases, the per
ceived slant of the surface tends to increase (become more
vertical), as illustrated in Figure II.16-2. This was demon
strated by Bridgeman and Hoover (2008) by having par
ticipants look at different fixation points along a hill of
constant slope. At farther distances, perceived slants were
greater. This effect is not due simply to a diminution of tex
ture information in the distance or changes in perspective.
The perceived orientations of large slanted surfaces (6°—36°)
increase approximately linearly as a function of log dis
tance even when gaze is straight ahead and monocular cues
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Figure II.16-2. For a farther observer, a hill will appear steeper, (a) An illustration of the empirically derived model of the effects of viewing
distance on perceived slant (Li & Durgin, 2010, 2013). At each distance, slant judgments have a gain of about 1.5 (the function is primarily
sinusoidal), (b) This one-parameter model fares well at predicting the hill estimation data of Proffitt et al. (1995): each white circle (in both
graphs) represents the model prediction for a specific hill slant taking into account both its slant and the optical distance to hill for an observer
at the base of the hill, viewing it with gaze forward, (c) The effect of distance generalizes to farther or nearer viewing: a hill of about 24° will be
estimated as 42° when standing at the base (with gaze forward, the optical distance to the hill would be about 3.6 m) but as 48° when standing
10 m back from the base (i.e., 13.6 m from the hill surface at eye level).
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strengthened by the effects of viewing distance. Perhaps
to distance are held constant using high-resolution virtual
a landmark could be more readily noted if its slant is ex
displays (Li & Durgin, 2010). This slope nonconstancy with
aggerated with distance, but using slant to orient to the
distance can be measured with both explicit verbal estimates
environment would seem, on the face of it, to demand more
of slant and with implicit slant estimates based on judgment
constancy rather than less. Similarly, a functional account
of perceived shape on the hill surface. That is, if an L-shaped
in terms of energetics should have trouble accounting for
configuration of balls is simulated on a hill surface and mea
nonconstancies. If a climbable slope seems insurmount
surement is made of the perceived ratio between frontal and
able when viewed in the distance, this does not seem par
sagittal arms of the L, one can use trigonometry to compute
ticularly useful for route planning. The only functionalist
the implied surface orientation relative to the line of gaze.
theory that seems to be directly compatible with distance
Such computations turn out to be roughly consistent with
effects (i.e., not contradicted by them) is the expanded
verbal estimates, helping to confirm that the overestimation
coding theory. Coding theory only need imply that slants
of slant is not simply a verbal error.
will be exaggerated to better act upon them. Within imme
In the classic hill slant estimation studies of Proffitt et al.
diate action space (several meters), the nonconstancies are
(1995), observers were asked to make slant judgments while
both
minor and fully predictable.
viewing the hills with gaze forward and standing near the
base of the hill. This means that shallow hills would have
been observed at a much larger optical distance than steeper
Failures of Constancy as Optical Slant Decreases
hills. For example, assuming an eye height of 1.6 m, a path
Li and Durgin (2009) found that downhill slants show a no
of 5° would only reach eye level 18 m away, whereas, a steep
ticeable failure of constancy, depending on viewpoint. Using
embankment of 33° would reach eye level within 2.5 m. To
controls for viewing distance, Li and Durgin reported that
address this confound, Li and Durgin (2010) conducted their
downhill slants appeared steepest when the direction of
study of effects of viewing distance. When viewing distance
view is nearly parallel to the hill surface, such as when our
was kept fixed, the relationship between slant and perceived
gaze first crests them. Many skiers have confirmed the basic
slant (in the measured range of 0°-36°) turned out to be well
observation that a downhill slope appears less steep as one
predicted by assuming that perceived slant increases with
gets closer to the edge. Some report that they try to maxi
a gain of 1.5 relative to physical slant (Li & Durgin, 2010).
mize the sense of danger by initiating the process of launch
In fact, a gain of 1.5 is consistent with the first quarter cycle
ing
themselves onto the hill before they have fully crested it.
of a sinusoidal function, which also seems to approximate
The
apparent steepening of the hill at the point where gaze
the function that relates physical slant to perceived slant
is nearly parallel with the surface may serve to signal uncer
for small surfaces in reach (Durgin & Li, 2012; Durgin, Li,
tainty or risk, but it nonetheless appears to be an incidental
et al., 2010). Li and Durgin (2013) have further developed a
effect rather than primarily functional because the steep
sine-based model as illustrated in Figure II. 16-2.
ening effect for downhill slants has a corresponding effect
Panel (a) of Figure II. 16-2 illustrates the principal features
for uphill slants: When gaze is nearly parallel to slant, the
of the models developed by Li and Durgin (2010, 2013): At
visual system tends to treat gaze direction itself as the sole
each viewing distance, the perceived slant functions have a
estimate of slant (Durgin & Li, 2011a). This effect has been
gain of approximately 1.5, but the effective intercepts of the
observed for real and simulated downhill surfaces (Li &
functions increase with the log of viewing distance. In this
Durgin, 2009) as well as for small uphill simulated surfaces
case we have plotted the slant functions for viewing distances
viewed at shallow optical slants, with gaze nearly parallel to
associated with each of six of the hills tested by Proffitt et al.
the surface orientation (Durgin & Li, 2011a).
(1995), as well as noting the specific slant shown at each dis
tance using the sine-based model of Li and Durgin (2013,
Equation 3). Panel (b) of Figure II.16-2 replots these predicted
Evidence for Constancy With Viewing Direction
points (and three others) along with the associated means
A surprising amount of constancy is evident in slant per
and standard errors from of Proffitt et al. Although the slant
ception with respect to the lateral direction of gaze. Proffitt,
model was developed using virtual displays and imphcit slant
Creem, and Zosh (2001) showed that, even when people
measurements fudging the aspect ratio of an L-shaped ar
looked at a hill from an oblique perspective, participants’
rangement of balls on a hill surface), it provides an excellent
estimates remained exaggerated. Proffitt et al. did not
fit to outdoor verbal estimation data.
control for viewing distance, but their data strongly sug
This nonconstancy of perceived slant with respect to view
gest that the encoding of three-dimensional slant provides
ing distance is hkely an incidental effect due to a failure of ste
substantial constancy with respect to direction of observa
reoscopic depth scaling. Although textbooks typically discuss
tion. For smaller, uphill surfaces, Durgin, Li, et al. (2010)
binocular disparity as a useful depth cue only for near space,
reported an impressive amount of constancy as well with
disparity information can be useful out to nearly a kilome
changes in the pitch of gaze, suggesting that coding biases
ter for surfaces that are sufficiently extended in depth (such
in slant perception affect geographical slant (slant rela
as hills), but the scaling of stereoscopic depth information is
tive to gravity) rather than optical slant (slant relative to
known to show poor constancy at far distances (Palmisano
the line of sight). As shown in Figure II.16-3a, Durgin, Li,
et al., 2010). Many people are aware of the fact that moun
et al. had participants estimate the slants of small surfaces
tains in the distance look essentially vertical. What is harder
either with gaze forward or with gaze declined by nearly
to notice (though it is observable) is that the apparent slants
45°. If slant misestimation were due primarily to distance
of hills gradually become shallower as we get closer to them.
foreshortening along the line of sight (also known as fron
If we consider the various functional accounts of hill
tal tendency”), then a board at about 60° from horizontal
misperception, it is difficult to see how any of them is
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should seem steeper with gaze forward (Fig. II.16-3a, right)
than with gaze downward (Fig. II.16-3a, left), but no sub
stantial differences were found. The function relating per
ceived slant to actual slant can be approximated by a sinu
soid for slants within arm’s reach (Li & Durgin, 2013). This
effect is not verbal/numeric: the same spatial bias occurs
whether numeric estimates are made relative to vertical
or to horizontal. Moreover, when a forced-choice procedure
was used to measure the bisection point between vertical
and horizontal, surfaces of about 34® from horizontal were
judged as being 45° (from horizontal and from vertical).
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Evidence for Constancy Across Surface Size
Although slant illusions are less dramatic for near surfaces
at eye level, in the range of slants between 0° and about 50°,
perceived orientation is expanded with a gain of about 1.5
(Durgin & Li, 2011a). This same 1.5 gain function is evident
in the models of large-scale slants discussed previously.
That is, the perceived orientation of small real surfaces pre
sented under full-cue conditions are expanded in the lower
half of the range by a factor of about 1.5, and exactly the
same scaling factor applies to large-scale hills. Thus the
perceived orientation of large-scale surfaces seems to be
no different, with respect to bias, than the perceived ori
entation of smaller-scale surfaces. The success of the sinebased model in capturing both the hill data and the data
from small surfaces shows that there is no discontinuity
between small and large surfaces in slant misperception (Li
& Durgin, 2013). This point, again, is consistent with the
expanded coding theory because it points to a generalized
coding scheme that applies to slant in general rather than
exclusively to landmarks or to intended paths of travel.
Evidence for Constancy Across Modalities
As reviewed by us elsewhere, a sine-based model can apply
to haptic surface perception by hand as well (Durgin & Li,
2012) and even to proprioception of hand orientation (Li &
Durgin, 2012b). Thus the underlying spatial bias function
in slant perception seems to be multimodal. Even in the
cases that seem exceptional, further analysis suggests good
calibration between modalities. For example, Durgin et al.
(2009) reported that verbal estimates of a 14.5° ramp were
only 26° when based on visual inspection of the ramp while
standing near the base (and looking down), whereas esti
mates from haptic information while standing on the ramp
were closer to 31°. The second (haptic) estimate corresponds
well with the sine-based model estimate of visually per
ceived slant for a 14.5° hill when viewed with gaze forward
from the base (with a viewing distance to surface of about
6.5 m). In other words, if a person were walking up such a
hill and simultaneously viewing the hill with gaze forward,
the visual perception of slant and the haptic perception
would be aligned (both would be about 31°). In contrast, the
26° estimate can be arrived at by using the actual viewing
distance to the ramp surface (about 2 m) in the model.
Summary of Slant Constancy

Figure II.16-3. (a) In near space, the same estimation function is
found for slant whether surfaces are viewed with gaze downwEU-d or
with gaze forward (Durgin, Li et al., 2010). (b) Hills look steeper when
standing back from the edge so that gaze is nearly parallel to the
surface of the hill. When optical slant (the angle between the center
of gaze and the surface) is small, surface orientation is pulled toward
the direction of gaze (Durgin & Li, 2011a; Li & Durgin, 2009). The
angular declination of gaze is itself exaggerated (independent of the
presence of the hill), which helps to account for the overestimation
even at the edge, (c) For steep ramps, estimates given when
blindfolded (haptic) more closely resemble visual estimates when gaze
is forward (even when the head is bowed; Hajnal et al., 2011), than
visual estimates when a nearer portion of the ramp is inspected.

The evidence we have reviewed here suggests that per
ceived slant shows marked failures of constancy with
viewing distance and with certain extreme directions of
gaze with respect to surface orientation. In contrast, visu
ally perceived slant is remarkably constant across most
changes in viewing orientation, across different scales of
surface size (when viewing distance is taken into account),
and across different modalities. Perhaps the most signifi
cant fact about the systematic biases in slant perception
is that these biases seem to be coded primarily with re
spect to the extrinsic reference frame specified by gravity
(Durgin, Li, et al., 2010) though some incidental effects in
dicate that there are also consistent biases with respect to
optical slant as well.
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has proven problematic, and no direct connection seems to
SOCIOCOGNITIVE FACTORS IN THE
exist between energetics and slant perception (e.g., Shaffer
EVALUATION OF SLANT
& Flint, 2011). A surviving tenet of this view, however, is
that geometric accuracy might not be the proper goal of
A number of reports have been made suggesting that
perceptual representation. This is also a tenet of expanded
slants look steeper to people for whom they represent
scaling theory, and if the exaggeration of perceived slant
a greater challenge to scale. Factors that have been re
incidentally helps people to more reliably evaluate the en
ported to affect the evaluation of slant include age, fit
ergetic affordances of the environment for the purpose of
ness, encumberment, fatigue (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999),
route planning, so much the better.
fear (Stefanucci, Proffitt, Clore, & Parekh, 2008), social
support (Schnall, Harber, Stefanucci, & Proffitt, 2008),
and blood sugar (Schnall, Zadra, & Proffitt, 2010). These
THE ROLE OF THE PERCEIVED DIRECTION
various studies have been critiqued extensively (Durgin
OF GAZE
et al., 2009; Durgin, Hajnal, Li, Tonge, & Stigliani, 2010,
2011; Durgin, Klein, Spiegel, Strawser, & Williams, 2012;
Because slant is defined relative to a gravitational reference
Durgin, Ruff, & Russell, 2012; Shaffer, McManama,
frame (i.e., the horizontal plane and the vertical vector of
Swank, & Durgin, 2013). In some cases, such as a study
gravity that is normal to horizontal), errors in perceived slant
of the elderly, the originally published data actually con
could come about if the presence of a hill produced a distortion
tradicted the hypothesis: The elderly gave lower estimates
in the perception of the horizontal plane. O Shea and Ross
for most hills, but this was not made evident in the initial
(2009) have provided evidence for such effects in the presence
report. In other cases, such as a study of fitness, confound
of large-scale mountains (see also Matin & li, 1992), and Ooi
ing factors (e.g., sex differences in slant estimation) were
and He (2007) have suggested that the ground plane itself is
not taken into account in the analyses (see Durgin, Hajnal,
perceived as being tilted upward. The magnitude of such ef
et al., 2010 for a discussion). In yet others concerned with
fects, however (about 3°-5°), is insufficient to account for the
fear, subjects may have been excluded from analysis in a
very
large magnitudes of distortion in perceived slant.
manner that inadvertently biased the results (see Durgin
Recently a much more dramatic distortion in perceived
et al., 2009, for a discussion).
gaze direction has been documented that seems more con
The critiques of the studies of encumberment are
sistent with the overestimation of slant. Specifically, much
worth reviewing briefly here. If participants in a study
as the perceptual gain for perceived slants (less than 45°)
are simply asked to wear a heavy backpack, they tend to
is about 1.5 when distance is fixed, Li and Durgin (2009;
give higher estimates for hills than do nonencumbered
Durgin & Li, 2011a) have used a variety of methods to docu
participants. However, they also tend to report that they
ment that the perceived declination of gaze is also coded
thought the backpack was supposed to make the hill look
with a gain of about 1.5. Durgin and Li (2011a; Li & Durgin,
steeper (Durgin et al., 2009; Durgin, Klein, et al., 2012). If
2012a) have proposed that angular variables relevant to the
the backpack is instead presented as carrying equipment
pitch axis are coded on an expanded scale so as to increase
essential to the conduct of the experiment (Durgin et al.,
their precision because they are highly relevant for action.
2009; Durgin, Ruff, et al., 2012; Shaffer et al., 2013), or
Gaze declination relative to the horizon is a powerful
participants are told not to let themselves be influenced by
cue to distance (Messing & Durgin, 2005; Ooi, Wu & He,
the backpack (Durgin, Klein, et al., 2012), the judgments
2001; Sedgwick, 1986; Wallach & O’Leary, 1982), because
that they give tend to be identical to those of nonencum
on leWl ground (and most of the spaces we deal with are
bered participants. In general, the use of heavy backpacks
within 5° of level) it provides highly reliable proprioceptive
that are transparently intended to increase estimates of
cue to ground distance. Given the bandwidth limitations
slant seem to produce social pressure on participants to
of neural transmission, coding this angular variable on an
elevate their slant estimates. Susceptibility to that social
expanded scale would preserve greater precision relevant
pressure can be mitigated by social support (Schnall et al.,
for the control of action. Thus a functional account of slant
2008) and may be exacerbated by low blood sugar (Durgin,
overestimation derives in part from the idea that angular
Klein, et al., 2012; Schnall et al., 2010; Shaffer et al., 2013).
distortions are present in perceptual experience in order
Durgin, Klein, et al. (2012) found that the effects of blood
to maintain precision for action. The expanded scaling of
sugar disappeared when participants were simply told
perceived gaze declination has been measured implicitly
to ignore the heavy backpack they were required to wear
(Durgin & Li, 2011a; Li & Durgin, 2009) based on slant
during such studies. Shaffer et al. (2013) showed that low
estimates viewed along different lines of sight; it has been
blood sugar produces opposite effects (lower estimates) if
measured directly with balls suspended in the air or placed
participants believe the drink (which they assume con
along the ground, and it has been measured by means of
tained sugar) was supposed to make the hill look shallower.
a bisection task (Durgin & Li, 2011a; see also Durgin &
Disputes over these sorts of controversial findings remain
Li, 2011b). In all cases the gain was found to be approxi
lively in the literature (e.g.. Firestone, 2013). It is very
mately 1.5. Studies of verbal distance estimation among
clear that social compliance can have powerful effects on
nonexperts tend to suggest linear compression of per
judgments and should be taken into consideration in stud
ceived ground distance by a factor of 0.7 to 0.8 (Loomis &
ies that are ostensibly of perception.
Philbeck, 2008), consistent with a misperception of gaze di
The idea that slant overestimation provides a means for
rection, as illustrated in Figure II.16-4a. Rather than hills
the direct perception of the energetic affordances of the en
looking steep because of distance foreshortening, it may be
vironment (Proffitt, 2006) is quite a clever one. However,
that ground distances are underestimated because crucial
much of the evidence amassed in support of this theory
194
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Figure II.16-4. (a) Independent of the presence of a ground surface,
perceived gaze declination (within 45° of horizontal) is exaggerated
by a gain of 1.5 (Durgin & Li, 2011a; Li & Durgin, 2009). (b) Asked
to set themselves the same distance from a pole as the pole is high,
participants set themselves much too far away (Higashiyama &
Ueyama, 1988). The mismatch between their perceptual experience and
the physical situation can be predicted by the scaling of the perceived
angular declination of gaze (Li et al., 2011).

angular variables, such as the angle of gaze declination,
are systematically misperceived.
Strikingly, this expanded scaling of perceived angular
declination of gaze (along with a concomitant scaling of op
tical slant) can predict not only downhill slant perception
(Li & Durgin, 2009; see Fig. II. 16-3, bottom) but also sys
tematic errors in the comparison of distance and height.
For example, Higashiyama and Ueyama (1988) developed a
task requiring participants to place themselves at the same
distance from objects (such as poles) as those objects were
high. Participants placed themselves much too far away, as
illustrated in Figure II.16-4b. Li, Phillips, and Durgin (2011)
recently replicated this experiment and extended it to show
that the exact pattern of results reported by Higashiyama
and Ueyama could be predicted by a parameter-free geo
metric model in which the previously measured angular
declination gain of 1.5 was assumed. This suggests that hill
misperception is part of a larger pattern of angular distor
tions that affect the perception of surface layout generally.
THEN WHY DO HILLS LOOK SO STEEP?
Slant misperception is dramatic. An editor at a journal
once challenged the statement that Lombard Street in San
Francisco is on a hill that is only 15° in slope. He said he
had checked the Internet and found that the true value is
31°. He was correct that many sites on the Internet report
a value of 31°. In fact, the tangent of 15° is 0.31, and so
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the grade of the hill is 31% (a 100% grade would be a 45°
slope). Since 15° is simply unbelievable for anyone who has
been to Lombard Street, many websites simply report this
as 31° (which still seems too low compared to the percep
tual phenomenology). The hill is so steep that Lombard
Street winds back and forth across it so as to reduce the
effective slant of the road to 10°—still quite steep when
walking up it!
As Marr (1982) pointed out, there are many different
forms of answers to questions about explanation, includ
ing the functional and the mechanistic. This chapter has
considered the phenomenology of hill perception while dis
cussing a variety of theories that have been proposed. One
answer to the question in the title might remain the one
put forth by Kammann (1967): because of gravity. The en
vironment in which we have evolved is laid out such that
vertical extents and slants are relatively tiny compared
to horizontal extents. Expanding the vertical scaling of
such an environment might produce many cognitive ad
vantages, even if that expansion is done in angular terms.
A second, mechanistic answer remains: because of a loss of
reliable information for depth along the line of sight. This
latter answer addresses the failure of slant constancy with
changes in viewing distance, but it cannot be the whole
story, because it does not account for the misperception
of downhill slant or the relative constancy of perceived
slant with large changes in angle of regard. This chapter
has emphasized that the misperception of hills is probably
part of a larger family of biases in the perception of angu
lar variables that includes the misperception of small sur
faces in reach and may even include the misperception of
ground distance and height based on multiplicative biases
in perceived angular deviations of visual direction from
horizontal.
Although this review has taken sides on some contro
versies, there is not room to address controversies over the
interpretation of different measurement techniques for
evaluating perceived slant (e.g., Coleman & Durgin, 2014;
Creem & Proffitt, 1998; Durgin, 2013; Durgin, Hajnal,
et al., 2010; Durgin, Li, et al., 2010; Li & Durgin, 2010,
2011, 2013; Shaffer, McManama, Swank, Williams, &
Durgin, 2014; Stigliani, Li, & Durgin, 2013; Taylor-Covill
& Eves, 2013; Witt & Proffitt, 2007). These controversies
focus around the question of whether using a haptic match
ing task to measure slant provides a route to a separate
(undistorted) dorsal stream representation.
It is therefore worth making one final point about the
nonconsequences of slant misperception. Our actions seem
to be coded in the same perceptual space as everything else
(Powers, 1973). This means that acting with accuracy in
a perceptually distorted world requires only that actions
be calibrated to the same distortions (Durgin, 2009). For
example, because proprioception of hand orientation is
distorted with precisely the same function as the haptic
and visual perception of surfaces (Li & Durgin, 2012b), the
perceptual distortions documented here are transparent to
our action systems. We can live and act effectively in a dis
torted visual world. Because the distortion is fairly stable,
and the correlations between motor signals and sensory
signals are maintained, even the effects of nonconstancy
with distance can be predicted and therefore ignored in our
normal perceptual experience. An important part of the
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answer to why hills (and even small surfaces in reach) look
so steep is therefore: Why not?
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